If a fictitious being is merely an alter ego of a single natural person, TROTWET functions well as the dominant rule and should suffice for regulatory purposes. However, there are many collective units that are not under the control of one person, governed, for example, by a certain fee structure distributed between members or shareholders. Fictional collective entities cannot be equated with individuals, so how could they have legal status under voluntary law? There are endless possibilities, limited only by the imagination of two or more natural people who adopt their own laws and lawyers capable of transmitting disputes between these people. However, at this early stage, some general possibilities are clear. Can fictitious beings, how individuals can recognize fictitious beings, recognize themselves under a kind of quasi-voluntary law? Not without having a legal system other than voluntary law. Legislation by fictitious entities belongs to another category of legal systems, which consists of legislating by fictitious territorial entities (i.e. states) and legislating by fictitious entities based on heritage (for example). B by private collectives of defense and justice under anarchic capitalism). It may be convenient for fictitious entities to deal with each other, as if each were a sovereign individual or subject to a higher authority that governs only collective entities.
That is why, even in a society that is otherwise totally voluntary, we can expect different classes of legal systems to coexist indefinitely. In a state of healthy coexistence, any legal system would be limited to its natural domain and its own domain: voluntary law on legal issues involving one or more individuals, and fictitious right to matters that concern exclusively fictitious enterprises. The laws of one system could influence laws in another, but would not be directly applicable in foreign areas. Laws that cover fictitious collectives could fall into two general classes: collective-voluntary law, in which each collective is sovereign and adopts its own effective laws against other collectives under a conflict regime such as TROTWET, and the collective delegated law in which collective entity associations delegate sovereignty over the right that transfers the entire association to a special collective. A quasi-contract (or tacit or constructive contract) is a fictitious contract recognized by a court. The concept of quasi-treaty can be attributed to Roman law and remains a concept used in some modern legal systems. In legal orders, the law of quasi-contract can be traced on the medieval form of the action known as indebitatus assumedsumpsit. In essence, the plaintiff would recover a sum of money from the defendant, as if the defendant had promised to pay it, that is, as if there were a contract between the parties.